Tag Archives: Jeffrey Goldberg

Will I save liberal Zionism?

I’ve been working on this blog post ever since I first read Peter Beinart’s excellent piece at the beginning of the week in the New York Review of Books about the relationship between American Jews and Israel, the failure of the American Jewish leadership, and the possibility of a “liberal” Zionism.

Since I started working on the post, there have been numerous responses from both the right and the left. A number of people I respect have taken issue with the concept of liberal Zionism in the first place (see the Magnes Zionist here) while Beinart did an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, the gatekeeping journalist of American Jewry. J Street has responded positively to the article, of course, because they are the ones trying to correct the problem of a Jewish leadership that is far to the right of the people it supposedly represents.

I’m not going to try to do Beinart’s article justice by summarizing it. I cannot recommend enough that everyone read the whole thing from start to finish. I’m also not going to try to contribute to the discussion about whether or not there can be a liberal Zionism or whether the concept is flawed from the beginning. Where I do think I can contribute, however, is by pointing out how clearly Beinart’s essay is about me, the author of this blog, and scores of people I know from Montclair, from Oberlin, and from Cairo.

Beinhart starts his essay with a story about a Republican pollster hired in 2003 to find out what Jewish students in the United States thought about Israel. He largely found that they don’t. (I’m an exception, I guess. I think about Israel a lot.) However, when prodded, the pollster found that these young Jews had opinions, just not the ones that the Jewish establishment holds. According to the pollster, we “resist anything [we] see as ‘group think’” and we “desperately want peace.” Some of us even “empathize with the plight of the Palestinians” believe it or not!

This represents a major shift from previous generations of American Jews. Beinart characterizes the changing relationship with the following passage, which reminds me of sitting around with my (brilliant) father at the kitchen table after dinner, picking at a chicken carcass, finishing our wine, and discussing the day’s news:

They vote Democratic; they are unmoved by biblical claims to the West Bank; they see average Palestinians as decent people betrayed by bad leaders; and they are secular. They don’t want Jewish organizations to criticize Israel from the left, but neither do they want them to be agents of the Israeli right.

These American Zionists are largely the product of a particular era. Many were shaped by the terrifying days leading up to the Six-Day War, when it appeared that Israel might be overrun, and by the bitter aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, when much of the world seemed to turn against the Jewish state. In that crucible, Israel became their Jewish identity, often in conjunction with the Holocaust, which the 1967 and 1973 wars helped make central to American Jewish life. These Jews embraced Zionism before the settler movement became a major force in Israeli politics, before the 1982 Lebanon war, before the first intifada. They fell in love with an Israel that was more secular, less divided, and less shaped by the culture, politics, and theology of occupation. And by downplaying the significance of Avigdor Lieberman, the settlers, and Shas, American Jewish groups allow these older Zionists to continue to identify with that more internally cohesive, more innocent Israel of their youth, an Israel that now only exists in their memories.

But these secular Zionists aren’t reproducing themselves. Their children have no memory of Arab armies massed on Israel’s border and of Israel surviving in part thanks to urgent military assistance from the United States. Instead, they have grown up viewing Israel as a regional hegemon and an occupying power. As a result, they are more conscious than their parents of the degree to which Israeli behavior violates liberal ideals, and less willing to grant Israel an exemption because its survival seems in peril. Because they have inherited their parents’ liberalism, they cannot embrace their uncritical Zionism. Because their liberalism is real, they can see that the liberalism of the American Jewish establishment is fake.

I’m not sure if I would go as far as to call the liberalism of the American Jewish establishment fake–I think that’s excessively strong language. The liberalism is genuine. I’m proud to say that American Jews were widely supportive of the civil rights and anti-war movements–including the aforementioned father. But when it comes to Israel, this commitment to human rights, peace and democratic values has been complicated by feelings of victimhood.

When the generation before mine was growing up, Jews were still banned from country clubs and certain neighborhoods. Top-tier private universities had quotas on Jewish students. Many among that generation had parents or aunts and uncles who escaped Europe’s anti-semitism just before it was too late. And anti-semitism still existed in the United States. This helped to solidify the sense of Jewish nationhood, which coalesces around Israel. Jeffrey Goldberg writes very explicitly in his book Prisoners about how getting beat up by anti-semites during middle school affected his decision to drop out of college and join the Israeli army.

I can’t relate to that. In New Jersey, where I grew up, you’re just as likely to find a Goldschmidt as a Williams on the green at the local country club. Harvard, needless to say, no longer has quotas. I’ve encountered far more anti-Jewish comments from French expats in Cairo (but not Arabs–that’s a story for another day) than I did in the 22 years I lived in the United States. This doesn’t mean that anti-Jewish sentiment doesn’t exist in the United States. It does, but we’ve come a long way and for this reason, my generation has none of this baggage connecting us to Israel and making us want to treat it exceptionally.

Beinart says it well:

This obsession with victimhood lies at the heart of why Zionism is dying among America’s secular Jewish young. It simply bears no relationship to their lived experience, or what they have seen of Israel’s. Yes, Israel faces threats from Hezbollah and Hamas. Yes, Israelis understandably worry about a nuclear Iran. But the dilemmas you face when you possess dozens or hundreds of nuclear weapons, and your adversary, however despicable, may acquire one, are not the dilemmas of the Warsaw Ghetto. The year 2010 is not, as Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed, 1938. The drama of Jewish victimhood—a drama that feels natural to many Jews who lived through 1938, 1948, or even 1967—strikes most of today’s young American Jews as farce.

Yup.

The essay ends with an impassioned plea to try to save Zionism from itself. My generation, Beinart argues to his audience in the New York Review, must not be allowed to abandon Israel completely. Instead, we have to push for a more just, more equitable Zionism. He uses the example of an impressive and growing protest movement in occupied East Jerusalem as an example of what we could become:

For several months now, a group of Israeli students has been traveling every Friday to the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah, where a Palestinian family named the Ghawis lives on the street outside their home of fifty-three years, from which they were evicted to make room for Jewish settlers. Although repeatedly arrested for protesting without a permit, and called traitors and self-haters by the Israeli right, the students keep coming, their numbers now swelling into the thousands. What if American Jewish organizations brought these young people to speak at Hillel? What if this was the face of Zionism shown to America’s Jewish young? What if the students in Luntz’s focus group had been told that their generation faces a challenge as momentous as any in Jewish history: to save liberal democracy in the only Jewish state on earth?

“Too many years I lived in the warm embrace of institutionalized elusiveness and was a part of it,” writes Avraham Burg. “I was very comfortable there.” I know; I was comfortable there too. But comfortable Zionism has become a moral abdication. Let’s hope that Luntz’s students, in solidarity with their counterparts at Sheikh Jarrah, can foster an uncomfortable Zionism, a Zionism angry at what Israel risks becoming, and in love with what it still could be. Let’s hope they care enough to try.

Well, as one of Luntz’s students (Luntz is the pollster mentioned earlier), I want to respond to the author: I think that he makes a strong and powerful case for upholding liberal values in the “only Jewish state on earth.” Perhaps if this conversation had emerged twenty years ago, there would be a better chance for saving Zionism for us. But I think that he misses something completely.

I think the time for supporting Zionism–even an “uncomfortable” one–may have passed. In a generation as globalized as mine, with access to international news through the Internet, with high rates of participation in study abroad programs, with cheap flights around the world, the concept of a Jewish state, and indeed the concept of ethnic nationalism at all, might be dying. (I realize I’m probably to the left of most Americans and American Jews, but I’m confident that this is the overall trend.) I hope, however, that as our commitment to ethnic nationalism fades, our commitment to human rights does not.

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Maybe Faisal Shahzad isn’t that simple

Robert Wright, writing on the New York Times website, had a very intelligent takedown of simplistic attitudes towards jihadism as exhibited by Daniel Pipes and Jeffrey Goldberg, who treat religious violence as an entity that exists on its own, divorced from any realities of the world, almost like it’s something some people are born with.

Wright invites Pipes and Goldberg (and many others) to imagine a more complex reality. He writes:

In the universe I’m positing, the following scenario is conceivable:

A Pakistani guy moves to America, goes to college, gets a job, starts a family. He grows unhappy. Maybe he’s having financial problems (though I’m skeptical, for reasons outlined by Charles Lane here, that Shahzad’s home foreclosure actually signifies as much); or maybe the problem is just that he doesn’t find his social niche. And maybe he was a bit unstable to begin with — which would make it harder to find his niche and might intensify his reaction to not finding it.

Anyway, for whatever reason, he feels alienated in America. He stays in touch with people and events back home in Pakistan, and this gives him another reason to dislike America: American drones are firing missiles into Pakistan, sometimes killing women and children.

Thanks to the Internet, it doesn’t take him long to find like-minded folks, or to come under the influence of a radical imam operating out of Yemen. “Jihadi intent” is taking shape, and eventually he comes into the fold of actual jihadis, a faction of the Taliban in Pakistan. They give him what he hadn’t found in America: a sense of belonging, a sense of purpose. The basic ingredients of bomb-planting behavior are now in place.

I think Wright makes a good point here. We (Americans, that is) need to understand that it’s possible that policies like invading Muslim countries, locking up accused terrorists in secret prisons, and supporting repressive “secular” regimes are making the United States less, and not more, safe. A prime recruiting tool for jihadist groups in Pakistan are videos depicting American violence against Muslims. Less violence would make for less propaganda.

But while I’m on the topic of Faisal Shahzad, I want to raise something else.

Shahzad supposedly trained with the Pakistani Taliban before attempting to set off a car bomb in Times Square. This has now been corroborated by the Pakistani intelligence services and, apparently, by a confessed accomplice in Pakistan. But the whole thing leaves me with some questions.

First of all, there is something odd about the bomb itself, which New York police described as “crude.” A militant organization with almost ten years of bombings under their belt (no pun intended) should presumably be able to train someone how to make a decent bomb, particularly in what would be a major operation for the group. But the thing that I find even more incongruous is the fact that Shahzad is still alive. He supposedly left the bomb in his Nissan and then fled the scene. That doesn’t sound that strange until you think about the regularity with which the Pakistani Taliban uses suicide bombers, not planted car bombs, in its attacks. Wouldn’t someone who has trained with the Pakistani Taliban be sufficiently indoctrinated to blow himself up? Wouldn’t that be a more surefire plan?

It’s also worth considering that the Pakistani Taliban has never attempted an attack outside of Pakistan before, though I suppose this could be explained away by going back to my (Robert Wright’s) earlier point about American policies encouraging radicalism. With predator drones, piloted from Virginia, killing Pakistani civilians almost daily, it’s certainly not inconceivable that the Pakistani group would attempt to expand its reach.

I’m not suggesting that the Times Square bombing attempt was fabricated or the connection to the Pakistani Taliban doesn’t exist. But it seems to me that the situation deserves a little more consideration than it has received.

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Postmodern Holocaust denial?

There’s an interesting dialogue at Standpoint Online (I’d never heard of it before) between Israeli author AB Yehoshua and British author Howard Jacobson.  (Via Jeffrey Goldberg, of course.)  I don’t agree with everything they say, but really appreciate their discussion the legacy of the Holocaust and how it intersects with discourse about Israel:

AB Yehoshua: …Where is this coming from, this extraordinary hostility, this attempt to deprive the Jewish people of its unique suffering?

Howard Jacobson: I can tell you what it is, but I’m not sure I can tell you where it comes from, because it comes from many sources; from outside Jews, and also very crucially from within Judaism. Lots of Jews are up to this trick, or whatever we call it. I see it as a new and much more sinister kind of Holocaust denial. Holocaust denial we can deal with now. Most of the world knows about it. We recognise the look of the people who do it and we know the nonsense of it, we just leave them alone and let them get on with it. But this is much more sinister and much more appealing, this one goes: “It was a terrible thing that happened to the Jews. We all know what a terrible thing Auschwitz was. Look, we concede it, you poor Jews.” It’s necessary that they demonstrate their degree of empathy for us. But what follows the sympathy is an analysis – a psychoanalysis – that is far from sympathetic: “You were traumatised by the Holocaust into visiting a Holocaust of your own upon the Palestinians.” It’s like the abused child who grows up and abuses the next child. We are now described as abusing the Palestinians in exactly the same terms as the Germans abused us – “abused” for God’s sake! And in this way, we are actually made to pay for the Holocaust itself. I talk about it as a kind of retrospective guilt for the Holocaust. It’s almost as if we’ve turned time the wrong way round, that because of what we are now doing to the Palestinians, we lose the right to the dignity of the Holocaust, if you can call it dignity.

This is a very sinister move. It’s at the heart of the Caryl Churchill play [Seven Jewish Children, performed at the Royal Court Theatre] and you get a lot of it at the universities, because it’s appealing in its neatness, it’s vaguely post-modern, you can mention Freud, you can chase around the names of several fashionable intellectuals. It is also very sinister, because it begs the question of what Israel is in fact doing or not doing to the Palestinians. Jewish trauma elides into Palestinian trauma, the cruelty Jews suffered into the cruelty Jews now dispense. It is not only that unequal things are equalised, but that the equalising settles the question of what is happening between the waring parties. Accept that the done-to have become the doers and the issue is settled…

I have to say I agree with Jacobson here.  It’s an absurd and tragic symptom of the obsession with collective psychology that we are even engaging in this discussion.  Despite all of Israel’s shortcomings when it comes to human rights,it is despicable to me to equate the Israelis with Nazis.  I think that Jacobson begins to explain why.

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Filed under History, Israel-Palestine, Jews, Postmodernism

What’s up with Dennis Ross?

Jeffrey Goldberg is trying to figure out where Dennis Ross will be working.  What exactly does Southwest Asia and the Gulf mean?  Goldberg quotes a State Department press briefing:

QUESTION: Can you give us – well, what is the State Department’s definition geographically of Southwest Asia? What countries does that include?
MR. WOOD: Matt, I didn’t –
QUESTION: No, you guys named an envoy for Southwest Asia. I presume that you know what countries that includes.
MR. WOOD: Yes. Of course, we know. I just – I don’t have the list to run off – you know, right off the top of my head here. But obviously, that’s going to encompass – that region encompasses Iran. It will – you know, it’ll deal with –
MR. WOOD: Well, he’s going to be in touch with a number of officials who work on issues throughout this region.
QUESTION: Does it include Iraq?
MR. WOOD: Indeed, it does…. .
QUESTION: And so, does it include parts of the Middle East?
MR. WOOD: Yes.
QUESTION: It does? Does it include Syria, and it includes Israel and it includes Jordan?
MR. WOOD: Well, he’ll be looking at the entire region that will include, you know–
QUESTION: Where does that stop? I mean, you know, you have NEA which, you know, runs all the way to Morocco. So does it include -
Okay, granted that is vague.  But it’s not hard to figure out what Dennis Ross’s geographic jurisdiction will be.  Iran.  He will be working on Iran.  This will probably include their nuclear weapons program, their support for Islamist groups across the world, Israel, oil, human rights… Iran is an important player on a number of issues.
A recurring theme for President Obama during the campaign was his willingness to engage in (always “responsible”) diplomacy.  That includes dealing directly with Iran.  But even if this is “without preconditions” it will not be done without preparation.  Dennis Ross is at the State Department to begin our diplomatic engagement with Iran.  I don’t know which issues he’ll work on first.  My guess would be nukes.
At least that’s how I see it.  Maybe I’m just hoping.

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Breaking Hamas like they broke Hizbollah

Jeffrey Goldberg–you can “accuse” him of being a Zionist as long as you want, I don’t care–knows as much as or more than pretty much any other American journalist about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  (I really recommend his book.)  What does he say about the possibility of breaking Hamas’s grip on power in Gaza?

The ideal situation, of course, is that the people of Gaza, realizing that Hamas has delivered them hardship, overthrow their government. But Hamas also alleviates the hardship it creates. The group has thoroughly penetrated the social fabric of Gaza. Its schools, orphanages, hospitals and soup kitchens serve the entire population. Hamas is not al-Qaeda. It delivers services, and because it delivers services, the population of Gaza depends on Hamas. I don’t see the removal of Hamas as a near-term possibility.

I’m inclined to agree.  In fact, I do agree.  Take, for example, the 2006 war in Lebanon as a point of comparison (a comparison that a lot of people seem to be making these days) and you will see that he is right.

In the wake of the 2006 war Hizbollah rebuilt southern Lebanon and the south side of Beirut.  They provided the services that people needed in the aftermath of Israel’s huge bombing campaign.  I saw this myself when I was in Tyre last winter.  People spoke glowingly about Hizbollah’s effective network of social services, in particular the way they cared for those whose homes had been destroyed by Israeli bombs.  Now their military wing has regrouped and their political wing is more powerful than ever.

Which brings us back to the question of what exactly the Israelis are trying to accomplish.  Their answer is obviously “Stopping the rockets!”–a legitimate one to be sure.  But do they think that this is the best way to do it?

Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah looking popular
Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah looking popular (in this poster and in real life)

Photo by Flickr user delayedgratification used under a Creative Commons license

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